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Part XIV: Cross-Cultural Morality
26. Cross-Cultural Research on

Kohlberg's Stages: The Basis
for Consensus
CAROLYN POPE EDWARDS

When Lawrence Kohlbcrg (1%9. 1971a) claimed that his moral stages were
culturally universal, he ensured that a storm of controversy would greet his theory.
He then intensified the controversy by further claiming that preliterate or semiliter
ate village peoples would generally fall behind other cultural groups in their rate
and terminal point of development due to a relative lack of 'role-taking opportuni
ties' in their daily lives.
Moral values arc known to vary so greatly from culture to culture that a
universal. invariant sequence in development or moral judgment is a provocative
claim. Furthermore. to characterize the difference between the moral judgment of
people in traditional face-to-face societies versus modern. complex. national states
as a difference in 'adequacy' of moral judging (Kohl berg. 1971a) seems to violate
norms of inter-cultural respect and ethical relativism.
Kohlbergs statements have been met by many theoretical statements at
tempting to refute aspects of his conclusions or assumptions about cultural uni
versality (see. for example. Bloom. 1977; Buck-Morss. 1975; Edwards. 1975. 19B2;
Shwedcr , 19R2a; Simpson. 1974; Sullivan. 1977). Equally of importance, the theo
retical controversy has stimulated much empirical research intended. at least in
part. to test the cross-cultural claims. Cross-cultural research is the only empirical
strategy that can actually establish or discount the universalizabiliry of the theory,
and for that reason it has been actively pursued. This paper will review the status
and current progress of comparative studies of moral judgment. 1 will attempt to
show why the work as a whole can be considered productive, tending toward in
creased rather than diminished understanding of the moral reasoning of human
kind. I will answer each of the following. pivotal questions below with a 'Yes. but
. , .' argument. Finally, 1 will try to show how, as comparative research has
proceeded to become increasingly elaborated in theoretical intent and sophisticated
in design and methods of analysis, it has quietly established its position as a viable
419
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field of research. Controversy remains. of course. hut it is a fruitful one, and there
is a solid core of issues upon which we can reach reasonable consensus.

Questions Central to Establishing the Universality of Kohlberg Moral Stages

2
3

Is the dilemma interview method a valid way of eliciting the moral
judgments of people in other cultures')
Is the standard scoring system appropriate and valid for cross-cultural usc?
Is cognitive-developmental theory useful for understanding psychological
development in comparative cultural perspective?

THE VALIDITY OF THE INTERVIEW METHOD

For the morel! dilemma methodology to be considered valid for either a particular
research study or comparative research in general requires three things. First. the
specific dilemmas used in research must be 'real' to the particular people involved,
that is, they must raise issues and pit values important to the respondents. This
criterion requires either development of new dilemmas appropriate to particular
cultural contexts or adequate adaptation of Kohlberg's Standard Interview.
Secondly, dilemmas and probing questions must be well translated into respon
dents' native language. and respondents' answers must be translated without
distortion back into the language of scoring. Thirdly. the interview methodology
itself must be adequate to the sensitive task of eliciting respondents' 'best'.
'highest", and most 'reflective' reasoning about morality (Edwards, 191-) I). The third
criterion is the most subtle and difficult to determine, but it is absolutely critical to
the success of the cross-cultural endeavour.
Research to date is uneven in quality according to the first criterion, but recent
research can surely be judged generally more satisfactory. Most researchers have
opted to adapt Kohlbergs standard stories rather than to create entirely new
dilemmas, in order to take advantage of standard scoring systems. This practice
assumes that standard stories (if adequately modified in details to fit the local
setting) present real and relevant dilemmas to people everywhere because they
share certain universal moral concerns, such as affectional. property and authority
issues. Such an assumption seems to me a fair one, with a notable exception. True
hunter-gatherer societies do not contain headmen or chiefs; nor do they contain
formal courts or governing institutions. People in these societies would not be
expected to make sense of problems pitting 'law' and 'life', or 'authority' and
'conscience' .
Regarding the first criterion. we can feel most confident about research
conducted by investigators who are thoroughly familiar with the cultures studied.
We can expect such researchers to have the best sense that the dilemmas used are
relevant and adequately adapted. The early research studies (especially Grimley,
1973; Kohlberg, 1969; Saadatrnand , 1(72) are flawed by serious weakness in terms
of trying to cover too much ground (four or five cultural settings each) with little or
no ethnographic description provided for each sample and its moral values. In
contrast, many of the recent researchers have focused in depth on their own society
or cultural group (c.g., Lutz Eckensberger. Germany; Jean-Marc Samson, French
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speaking Canada; Y. H. Chern. S. W. Cheng and T. Lei. Taiwan: Muhammed
Maqsud , Nigeria; Bindu Parikh. India). In other cases. researchers have gained
thorough familiarity of the cultures they studied. For example. Sara Harkness lived
as an anthropologist for three years in Western Kenya. and John Snarey provides
detailed ethnographic description of the Israeli kibbutz where he based his work.
Although these researchers have not generally commented on how well dilemmas
have seemed to 'work' in their studies. when they do. their comments have been
generally positive. For example. Harkness. Edwards and Super (191'1) say. 'AII of
the men readily accepted this task and became quite involved in giving their
judgments' (p. 59R).
Only a few researchers have experimented with creating entirely new dilem
mas. I found (Edwards. 1<)75, 1<)7R) that Kenyans were intensely interested and
provoked by a new dilemma, called Daniel and the School Fees. However, I did
not systematically compare subjects' level of responses to the new versus standard
stories. Charles White and colleagues (197H) found in pilot work in the Bahamas
that there were no stage differences in response to their new versus the standard
dilemmas, so they did not pursue its use. By far the most original approach has
been taken by Benjamin Lee (1973.1976). Lee. an American of Chinese descent,
departed completely from the standard stories and developed a series of 'filiality'
stories to study moral reasoning in Taiwan. Filiality is a core Chinese value. of
course, and Lee reports (personal communication) that subjects, especially those of
the older generation, scored higher on tiliality than standard stories. because
'fairness' was not an important issue for them. Lee's research illustrates how
broadening the interview base to issues outside the core concerns of Westerners
can enrich, not undermine, the structural approach to moral development. Further
work. in my opinion, should involve quantitative and qualitative comparison of
people's responses to original versus standard dilemmas. Such an approach would
fully and adequately meet criterion one and lead to an improvement or elaboration
of the theory.
Criterion two concerns adequacy of translation. Only one set of German
researchers has taken the notable step of translating not only dilemmas but also the
scoring manual into another language (Eckensberger , Eekensberger and Rein
shagen, 1<)75 -6). Most other researchers have translated the dilemmas into
subjects' native language. then translated answers back into English for scoring.
Their procedures have probably met at least minimal standards, especially when
investigators, such as Jean-Marc Samson. are bilingual. with their first language the
target non-English language. They have considered carefully problems of translat
ing ethical terminology. For example, Parikh (19HO) states, 'The first lO translations
were checked by a professor of English and a native of Gujarat. A list was made of
those words for which it was difficult to get equivalents in English and this list was
then discussed with a professor of Gujarati and another of English' (p. 1(33).
However, translation is a fascinating subject in its own right that deserves
closer inspection and analysis. No researcher. for example. has yet compared
responses to a dilemma as translated by several different people. or compared
moral maturity scores given to the same interview as translated into English by
several different translators. Past researchers. quite rightly perhaps. have been
more interested in simply taking the initial step of seeing whether moral judgment
scores distribute themselves in a predictahle or reasonable way over a target sample
of people.
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Criterion three concerns whether the interview method is able to elicit the very
best and most mature reasoning about moral problems in cultures other than our
own. This is an extremely difficult question, and common to research on cognition
and social cognition in general, not just Kohlbergian research. The crux of the
problem revolves around those groups who seem to show least high-stage reason
ing. Findings from a large number of studies (reviewed in Edwards, 19K\. 19K2)
have indicated that moral judgment Stage 5, and perhaps even full-Stage 4, arc not
found in interviews with prelitcrate or semiliterate adults who live in relatively
'traditional', small-scale societies, such as isolated peasant or tribal communities.
Are these stages really missing, or are the results an artifact of testing bias? There
are, in my opinion, good theoretical grounds for thinking that Stage 3 may be the
stage at which the judgment of village adults stabilizes. The underlying structure of
Stage 3 corresponds well to the social and moral order of a society based on
face-to-face relations and a relatively high level of normative consensus (Edwards.
1975, 198\. 1982; Nisan and Kohlberg. 19K2). However, it is still important 10
consider carefully the fundamental problems that exist with eliciting moral
reasoning by asking people to reflect upon moral dilemmas.
The moral dilemma interview is best seen as a way to elicit a particular part of
people's moral thinking. their 'conscious reflections' rather than intuitive or implicit
knowledge about morality (cf. Pool. Shwedcr and Much. 19l:\3). The interview
stimulates people to explain their justifications and to self-reflectively volunteer
criteria for decision-making. Do adults in all types of societies have this capacity?
'Yes'. we can answer. considering the fact that adults in a wide range of cultural
groups studied so far seem 10 enjoy dilemma discussions. They find it congenial to
play the role of what Kenyans called the 'moral elder and formulate their wisest.
most considered opinion about posed, hypothetical problems.
Richard Brandl, a philosopher who many years ago studied Hopi ethical
systems. similarly concluded that ethical principles are probably culturally univer
sal. He inferred thai 'wrong' had a true ethical meaning to the Hopi: 'If I were
normal. impartial. and fully informed. I should feel obligated not to perform X'
(Brandt, 1954. p. 1(9). Although Brandt had to piece together his picture of the
Hopi's implicit principles from rather brief answers to formal dilemmas sup
plemented by many related remarks in other conversations. he believed that his
results make 'a highly unfavorable beginning for any person who thinks the
"moral" concepts of primitive peoples are quite different from. and vastly more
simple and less elevated than our own' (p. 9K).
Nevertheless. Kohlberg's highest stages are consistently missing in the inter
views from certain groups. and this may relate to the level of formal discourse
required for them. John Gibbs (1977, 1979; Gibbs and Widaman, 1982) has put
forward the case that Stages 5 and 6 of Kohlbergs system are different from Stages
1 to 4. While Stages I to 4 are genuine developmental stages, Gibbs feels that
Stages 5 and 6 are something else-namely, 'second-order' thinking about moral
ity, 'meta-ethical reflections' on the decision-criteria constructed at an earlier
stage-a kind of thinking made possible primarily by higher education. Gibbs, a
close collaborator of Kohlberg, proposes to constructively revise the system by
re-Iabelling Stages 1 and 2 as 'immature', Stages 3 and 4 as fully 'mature', and Stages
5 and 6 as a 'theory-defining level of discourse'. In a somewhat similar vein,
Eckensberger and Reinshagen of Germany (1977. 1981), on the basis of theoretical
analysis and their reading of the comparative literature, have suggested that Stages
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J to 3 are the basic developmental structures. Stages 4,4/5 and 5, they speculate,
represent horizontal decalages of the first three structures into less obvious content
areas (social systems rather than concrete others).
Both of these sets of suggestions arc very important from a comparative
perspective. Although many adults in all societies seem able to step into the 'moral
elder' role (Stage 3 or .+) in reflecting upon moral problems, they are not equally
able to assume the 'moral theorist' role, as required for Stages 5 and 6. As
anthopologist Richard Shweder ( !lJK2b) has said, 'Children and most adults in most
culture" are not very good at spontaneously articulating the distinctions. ideas, and
concept" underlying their sense of morality. Most people do not know how to talk
like a moral philosopher' (pp. )~~Sl). While every cultural environment is indeed
'packed with implicit messages about what is of importance, what is of value, who
counts as a person' (Shwcder , IlJ~2b, p. )6: also see Read, ISl))), nevertheless
most people in traditional societies may not he able to discourse at the 'theory
defining level' about what they know and think (Horton. 196K). Still, if critics are
correct that the first 3 or .+ stages arc the core developmental ones. then we can
comfortably conclude that the moral dilemma method has shown itself surprisingly
congenial to a wide variety of cultural groups with social systems at very different
levels of political and economic complexity.

THE VALIDITY OF THE SCORING SYSTEM

The standard scoring system depends upon the theoretical notion that basic.
universal moral judgment structures can he differentiated from highly variable,
culturally-specific contents. Cross-cultural data. therefore, should 'fit' thc scoring
system. Problems can arise from two types of data: (1) data which seem to match
most closely the criterion statements of one stage (c.g.. Stage 2). hut which really
seem to flow from the social perspective or underlying structure of another stage
(e .g., Stage 3): and (2) data which arc 'unscorablc, i.c .. do not match any of the
standard scoring categories. Insofar a" empirical data present a serious challenge to
either of these two varieties, they suggest that the scoring system is invalid or at
least in need of revision.
Finding IIIIV anomalies. however. is not necessarily had news for the theory.
The scoring system is regarded by cognitive-developmental researchers as a living
being. and new data that suggest way" to improve the scoring system can represent
good news. The task of constructing and revising scoring categories that adequately
distinguish form from content has been a continual one. Hard-to-score data arc
actually helpful if they suggest concrete ways to improve the scoring system.
Past researchers have reported that their cross-cultural data arc generally
readily scorable. Inter-rater reliabilities. where determined. have achieved
acceptable standard" of agreement. Researchers have commonly presented illustra
tive material to show how the reasoning of their target group had culturally-typical
contents yet revealed an easily recognizable underlying structure. Most data
labelled as 'unscorable, especially from child subjects. consisted merely of brief
'yes' or 'no' statements, or responses that were too incomplete to reveal their
underlying stage (hut for an exception, sec Tomlinson, I Sl~3).
Recently. however. researchers have begun to report upon and critically
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cxanunc hard-to-score data from adult subjects and to suggest that these data are
problematical. All of thc-«- scoring problems refer to amhiguitics in Stage~:;, 4 and
:'. For example, Snarcv ( 1l)~2) and Snarcv. Reimer and Kohlbcrg ( 19~4) analyze
difficult-to-score reasoning by Israeli kibbutz respondents. Tiley dcscr ibe how some
subjects hlind-scorcd as Stage 4 or 4!.'i were determined hy a 'culturally sensitive'
scorer to he Stage:'. They conclude that the scoriru; manual needs to he 'fleshed out
with cultural Iv indigenous cx.unplcs, especially at the higher stages (Snarcy, 1l)~2,
p. 317). Cheng and Lei (19~J) provide examples of Taiwanese reasoning that they
thought difficult-to-score: some of the material seemed to he either tr ansitionul
bctwcenJ and 4. or between 4 and S, but the categories and distinctions provided in
the scoring manual did not allow accurate determination. Thev concluded, 'More
clear delineation of the structure of the stage~ and better designed probing
questions seem to be in need' (p. ]6).
In research in Kenya. I too found several examples of hard-to-score inter
views. While most of the interviews were rcadilv scored, the most difficult ones
were long and complete hut arguably either Stage:; or 4. These were interviews
with mature adults who had not attended formal schooling beyond the primary
grades. The men were 'community moral leaders'. that is, respected elders often
called to advise at hearings between local disputants.
To illustrate the way that interviews reflecting a non-Western frame of values
and perspective upon societv can be difficult to score-s-and to add to the growing
literature seeking to elaborate constructively the scoring system--Iet me present
two cxarnplc s. The excerpts raise the fundamental question of whether Stage 4
merclv requires a rough appreciation or society's need lor institutionalized roles. or
whether it requires a full-blown understanding of the organizational aspects of a
social structure and the operation of a leg;" systcm (paraphrase of Cheng and Lei,
19~1, p. 16). What the Kenyan elder- have is a clear and elaborated vision of fair
and reasonable rules for running a prosperous extended family, based on 'unity',
'respect', and 'understanding', key Kenyan traditional values.
From an interview with a Kikuyu man. age :'3, with three years of schooling
(Edwards. 197:'; dilemma is Daniel and the School Fees):
(jIlCl{lOn. In ~eneral. should a wown-up "1Il obcv all of his parents' wishes') 1'\'11\, or whv not"
Alii ,,'cr: The parents should not authorize Daniel to educate his brothcr', son. They should
only advise him. Daniel has a home to 1001-. after since he left his parents, and it's a complete
house with one person as head, not two. So he should not ohev his parcnr- hut should consider
their advrccs.
(Jiles/ion: Is it more important for Danivl to maintain harmonious relations with his wile. or
with his brother and parents" Why"
Allswcr: Once one is married. we sal' in Kik uvu socictv that. 'lie is out of his parents'
hands . . ' The husband will he the Chairman and the wife the Treasurer, and as such she will
control the rcsourccv. That Is whv Daniel', wife wants Ito usc the Iarnilv moncv] tll put her son in
school.
{j1l£'stiulI: Would vou condemn Daniel It he just moved awav tll the citv and did not help hi,
brotbcrx son?
AnIwa: We cannot condemn Darnel
because it's ri~hl lie can onlv carry \\ irh him one
home, not two. lie can offer help if he can in other ways. If WL' draw a picture like this, we sec
that there arc different generations being founded. Daniel is now verv tar from Karnuu I his older
brother who put Daniel himself through school].

Parents

Daniel~lKamau
Daniel's Son_..J

Karnaus Son
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From an interview with a Kipsigis man, age 55, unschooled (Harkness,
Edwards and Super, 19~1; dilemma is adaptation of Joe story).
Question: Should Jumc« refuse to give his father the muncy"
AIl.III'er: If his father is a squanderer. then he shouldn't be given, But if he keeps it well. the
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rather is like a bank, and he should keep it.
Question: Should the father always direct the son')
Answer: For the son to refuse to take his father's advice shows that he is not well cared for
But when you [a father) convince him [your son] by telling him, 'Do this sort of thing because this
will earn us our living. You didn't do it this time, but do it next time.' then the child will comply
since you did not command (shout at) him
and so both of vou will be in good unity and
understanding of each other.
(juestion: Which is worse, for a father to break his promise or tor a son')
Answer: Ill' the father breaks his word] it will cause hatred because the son will be angry.
saying. 'I wanted to follow my own intentions, but my rather cheated: he permitted me and then
refused me. Now I don't want to hear more of his words. He can't love me and is unable to
protect me.' So it is bad. [However], the one for the son is worse. Imagine a child disobeying my
own words. is he really normal"
Rules arc mine and I want him to follow, e.g. 'Do this thing
to earn you a living', as I did follow my father's rule, also
Father's bad deeds arc revealed
when he docs not care for his children
That man i, like a drunkard whose children do not
sleep at home because he drives them away when not sober. The man doe, not have rules which
work and so it is bad. But if he has good functioning rules, he is able to keep his Iamilv. The
maize will be growing because or his good work. Then it ix clear that his family is well looked
after.

In conclusion, there seems a clear consensus that the scoring system has
provided a useful tool for analyzing cross-cultural data, However. subtle distinc
tions between the higher stages need to be further clarified, and form and content
need to be further differentiated to broaden definitions of stages or levels beyond
Stage 3.

ir

g

THE USEFULNESS OF THE THEORY FOR EXPLAINING HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT

As explained in the earlier sections of this paper, recent years have seen the
accumulation of many studies focused on groups other than the dominant majority
culture of the USA, These studies allow us to consider our final question, whether
cognitive-developmental theory has proven useful for understanding individual
development within or between cultural groups,
The within question is surely less controversial and includes two parts, First, do
the central claims of the theory about development (especially invariance of
sequence) hold up in cross-cultural studies? Second, do specific examinations of
moral judgment in relationship to experiential or background variables lead to
increased understanding of the processes facilitating development? We cannot
examine each of these questions in detail. but we can indicate the general shape of
an answer.
In my recent survey, I found the following studies focused on groups from
outside the mainstream US culture (also see review in Snarey. 1982):
The Americas
USA Alaskan Eskimo (Saxe, 1970)
Puerto Rican (Pacheco-Maldonado. 1972)
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Canada

Germanic Hutterite (Saadatmand, 1(72)
French (Marchand-Jodoin and Samson, 19~2; Samson, \9~3)
English (Sullivan, \975; Sullivan and Beck, \975; Sullivan,
McCullough and Stager. 1979; Sullivan and Quarter. 1(72)
Bahamas (White, 1975, 1977; White, Bushnell and Regncrner. 197~)
Guatemala (Saadatrnand, 1(72)
Honduras (Gorsuch and Barnes, 1(73)
Mexico (Kohlberg, 19(9)

Asia
India (Parikh, 1975. 19~(); Saraswathi, Saxena and Sundaresan, 1(77)
Iran (Saadatrnand. 1(72)
Israel Kohlberg, with Bar Yam, 1971 b: Snarcy, 19~2; Snarcy. Reimer
and Kohlbcrg, 19~4)
Hong Kong (Grimley, 1973, 1(74)
Japan (Grimley, 1973, 1(74)
Taiwan (Cheng and Lei, 19~1; Chern, 197K: Kohlherg. 1969; Lee. 1973,
1976)
Thailand (Batt, 1974. 1(75)
Turkey (Nisan and Kohlbcrg, 19~2; Turicl , Edwards and Kohlberg,
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Africa
Kenya

(Edwards, 1974. 1975,

197~;

Harkness, Edwards and Super,

19~1)

Nigeria (Maqsud , 1976, 1977a. 1977b. 1979.
Zambia (Grimley, 1973, 1(74)
Europe
France (O'Connor, 1974, 19i'\()
Finland (Helkarna. 19~ 1)
Germany (Eckenshcrgcr , 19~3; Giclcn ,
ger,

Grear Britain

19~2)

stirm
indiv
19~2;

Villenave and Eckensber

19~2)

(Grimley. 1973, 1974; O'Connor. 1974, 19~(); Simon and
Ward, 1973; Simpson and Graham. 1971; Tomlinson,
19~3; Weinreich, 1977)

A ustralia and Oceania
New Zealand (Moir , 1(74)
Two types of societies still represent critical nussmg cases: (1) foraging
(hunter-gatherer) societies, which lack social classes or hierarchy and also formal
political and legal institutions; and (2) societies such as those of Eastern Europe,
USSR, and Peoples' Republic of China, which are complex nation-states but based
on non-capitalist economies. A further serious weakness of the literature is that the
only longitudinal cases in the above list are from the Bahamas, French Canada,
Israel, Great Britain and Turkey. The great majority of studies are cross-sectional.
due to the enormous expense and difficulty of conducting longitudinal work.
The proposition of invariant sequence requires that stage development be
stepwise and progressive, with stage regressions and stage skippings no greater than
expected by chance (measurement error). All of the cross-sectional studies have
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found average moral maturity and/or upper-stage-range to increase with age during
the childhood and adolescent years (with the exception of the Hutteritc sample).
No studies have found any 'missing' stages between the lowest and highest stages
present in a sample. Furthermore. the longitudinal studies (with the probable
exception of Tomlinson 's. 19S3. British sample) have supported these conclusions
by indicating no significant amounts of stage regression over time. Thus, while the
available data cannot positively demonstrate invariant sequence, taken together
they strongly suggest that development change is generally gradual and positive
throughout the childhood and adolescent years, in a wide variety of cultural groups.
Most investigators. naturally. conducted their research with broader questions
in mind than merely invariant sequence. Taking advantage of the natural range of
variation in social life worldwide. they have been able to gain increased leverage on
understanding experiential influences. For example. a number of researchers from
the list above have been able to show that the following experiential factors relate
positively to moral judgment. i Note: the dates of the studies are provided only
when necessary for the reader):
socioeconomic status (Grimley: Kohlberg with Bar Yam; Nisan and Kohlberg:
Simpson and Graham: Turiel et al.);
residentialjactors, e.g.. living in city or village. or city versus kibbutz (Gorsuch
and Barnes: Nisan and Kohlberg: Snarcy: Turicl et al.):
educational level (Ratt: Edwards. !lJ75):
school experiences (Edwards. IlJ7~: Maqsud. all studies: Marchand-Jodoin and
Samson; Sullivan. 1975; Sullivan and Beck);
parental discipline. warmth or identification (Parikh: Saadatrnand: Simpson
and Graham).

These studies taken together converge to suggest that moral judgment level is
stimulated hy at least three general types of experiences. that increase: (I) an
individual's contact with a diversity of personal or cultural values; (2) an individual's
ability to reason in formal or school-like ways about moral issues: and (3) an
individual's tendency to lake as one's reference group a complex society. The
research allows a genera! consensus that conditions that lead to development in one
group arc comparable to conditions that lead to development in other groups.
Finally. we return to the issue with which this paper opened: how valid is
Kohlbergs theory for comparing moral development (and moral adequacy)
between people of different cultural groups?
Even on this controversial issue a certain consensus may be achievable. It is
noteworthy that in response to criticism. Kohlberg has revised his own earlier
position. He now states (in Kohlbcrg. Levine and Hewer. 19K")):
We do not believe that the comparison of one culture to ;1l1other in terms of III or a I development is
a theoretically useful strutcgy for the growth of scientific knowlcunc..
It is difficult to
understand what a valin concept of 'comparative moral worth 01 culture' 11lIght be. but in any case
such a concept could not be established Oil the ba,is of a comparison of mcan-, on our moral
judgment assessment scale. There is no direct way 111 which group averages can he translated into
statements 01 the relative moral worth of groups (p. IU).

In other words. cross-cultural differences have nothing to do after all with the
relative moral worth or adequacy of moral judging. Moral judgment stages. from a
cross-cultural point of view. arc simply not achievements for which higher is
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necessarily better. Rather, Kohlbcrg's theory and methods offer just one useful
way to study developmental growth in wisdom or 'conscious reflectiveness' in moral
decision-making. Certainly they do not begin to encompass all that we would like to
know in terms of understanding how human beings across the spectrum of world
cultures develop in the capacity to make moral choices. Nevertheless, Kohlbergs
theory and methods have surely generated a productive line of comparative
research that has become more sophisticated, multidimensional and theoretically
lively over time.
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